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Cole: Cole: Arbitrator and the Double Jeopardy Clause:

THE ARBITRATOR AND THE
DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE:
DOES THE POSTMAN ALWAYS
RING TWICE?
United States v. Reed1

I. INTRODUCTION
When an arbitrator's decision is adverse to one party, does the double
jeopardy clause2 prohibit further pursuit of the claim by the successful party?
With the rising emphasis being placed on arbitration clauses in collective
bargaining agreements, it was only a matter of time before this question arose in
the workplace. In United States v. Reed3 the Eleventh Circuit established the test
for determining if an arbitrator's decision invokes the double jeopardy clause.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
This case arises out of a petty theft incident involving Ulysses Reed, Jr., a
letter carrier for the United States Postal Service.' The postal service dismissed
Reed for misappropriating $364.58, which he received from postal customers for
cash on delivery parcels.' Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement
between the National Association of Letter Carriers and the Postal Service, Reed
filed a grievance challenging his dismissal and initiated binding arbitration to
resolve the dispute. The arbitrator found that, while Reed did not follow proper
accounting procedures, evidence of misappropriation was weak and ordered him
reinstated without loss of seniority.' However, the arbitrator mandated that he be
placed on a thirty-day "disciplinary suspension. "8
Charges were later brought against Reed in a criminal indictment. 9 The
indictment cited three violations of title 18 U.S.C. section 1711, which prohibits

1. 937 F.2d 575 (11th Cir. 1991).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. Reed, 937 F.2d at 575.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.at 576.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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the misappropriation of postal funds. 10 Reed moved to dismiss the indictment
on grounds that any criminal charges stemming from the incident would violate
the double jeopardy prohibition of the fifth amendment of the United States
Constitution, since he had already received punishment in the form disciplinary
suspension."
The government conceded that the charges were derived from the same
incident, but maintained that the arbitrator's decision did not rise to the level of
punishment needed to invoke the double jeopardy prohibition. 12 The United
States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama denied Reed's motion
to dismiss and he appealed. 3
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that an arbitrator's
decision and any other civil sanction only implicates the double jeopardy clause
if they "cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can be
explained only as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, then the
sanction constitutes punishment."' 4 The court of appeals determined that the
arbitrator's decision in the instant case was a remedial measure designed to
vindicate the rights of the Postal Service under the collective bargaining agreement
and therefore could not be classified as punishment. 5 As a result, the court held
that the district court properly denied Reed's motion to dismiss the indictment.' 6
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Double Jeopardy
17
The concept of protection against double jeopardy is rooted in ancient law.
The Greeks and the Romans knew of the concept, even if they did not abide by
it fully.'" The canon law which developed near the close of the Roman Empire
also contained a double jeopardy prohibition.' 9 This was based on St. Jerome's
reading of the Old Testament, which reads "[t]here shall not rise up a double

10. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 1711 (1988) (outlines the crime of misappropriation of postal funds). The
statute provides for punishment in a fine equal to the amount or value of the money or property
embezzled or imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both. Id. However, if the amount of value
of the money or property is less than $100, the punishment shall not exceed $1,000 in fines or exceed
one year in prison, but include a combination of the two penalties. Id.
11. Reed, 937 F.2d at 576.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 577-78.
15. Id. at 578.
16. Id.
17. J. SIGLER, DOuBLE JEOPARDY:

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SoCIAL PoLtCY 3

(1969).
18. Id.
19. Id.
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affliction."2" It appears that this principle was based on a belief that God does
not punish twice for the same transgression and that man should do likewise. 2
When looking at English history, the concept of protection against double
jeopardy does not have a distinct and traceable lineage.22 There is no mention
of it in the Magna Carta or any English statute before the adoption of the United
States Constitution. 23 However, both Coke and Blackstone, the two preeminent
English jurists who are synonymous with the common law itself, wrote that double
jeopardy protection was grounded on a universal maxim: Nemo debet bis vexari
pro una et eadem causa. 24 Translated, this means: "It is a rule of law that a
man shall not be twice vexed for one and the same cause." s There is
speculation that Coke promoted a double jeopardy prohibition as just another way
of limiting the power of the king, whom Coke distrusted.26 Coke viewed any
limitation upon the king's power of discretion as beneficial.27
Prior to the adoption of the Bill of Rights, many of the newly independent
states developed double jeopardy prohibitions in their state laws. 28 However,
incorporation into the federal constitution was, without a doubt, the most important
event in the development of double jeopardy. 29 Nonetheless, as of 1789, the
debate over what constituted double jeopardy had just begun.30 In fact, there are
few provisions of the Constitution that have been litigated more than the double
jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. 3'

B. The Double Jeopardy Clause
The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment of the United States
Constitution reads: "nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be
33
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."32 In 1969, in North Carolina v. Pearce,
the United States Supreme Court ruled that these words offer three separate
constitutional protections: (1) protection against a second prosecution for the same

20. Id.; Nahum 1:9.
21. J. SIGLER, supra note 17, at 3.
22. Id. at 4.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 16.
25. Id. at 21.
26. Id. at 19.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 21-23. The Massachusetts Code of 1648, which was the first comprehensive statement
of the duties and rights of the inhabitants of the colony, contained the double jeopardy concept, and
similar provisions were adopted soon after in Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania and New Jersey.
Id. at 22.
29. Id. at 28.
30. Id. at 28-33.
31. Id. at v.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

33. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
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offense after acquittal, (2) protection against a second prosecution for the same
offense after conviction, and (3) protection against multiple punishments for the
same offense.34 The court further stated that "the Constitution was designed as
much to prevent the criminal from being twice punished for the same offense as
from being twice tried for it.""
Twenty years after the Pearce decision, the question of what exactly
constituted punishment was still very much undecided. In United States v.
37
Halper,3 a defendant was tried and convicted for filing false Medicare claims.
The court sentenced the defendant to two years in prison and fined him $5,000.38
Later, the government attempted to impose a statutorily authorized civil penalty
that amounted to $130,000. 39 The Supreme Court determined that the ciil
4
penalty was disproportional to the harm actually suffered by the government. 0
Therefore, the penalty rose to the level of "punishment" within the meaning of the
fifth amendment and violated the double jeopardy clause. 4
In Halper, the Supreme Court set forth a test to determine if civil sanctions
rise to the level of punishment within the meaning of the fifth amendment.4 2 The
court stated that what constitutes punishment must not be determined from the
defendant's perspective. 43 Rather, the key is to determine what purpose the civil
sanction is attempting to serve. 44 If the civil sanction can be characterized as
remedial, rather than as a deterrent or retributive, then it is not classified as
punishment.45 If the civil sanction is not "punishment," then it fails to invoke the
double jeopardy clause. 46
Halper dealt with imposing civil penalties upon a defendant after he was
subject to a criminal prosecution. 7 In United States v. Bizzell,48 the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals dealt with the opposite situation. The Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) charged Bizzell with violation of
mortgage regulations.49 Bizzell entered into a settlement agreement wherein he
would pay HUD $30,000 and be suspended from participating in HUD programs

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 717.
Id. at 718.
490 U.S. 435 (1989).
Id. at 437.
Id.
Id. at 439.
Id.
Id. at 440.
Id. at 448-49.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 449.
Id.
Id.
921 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 265.
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for two years. 50 The agreement specifically stated that the payment was solely
5
for settlement of the administrative action and was not full restitution to HUD. 1
Subsequently, Bizzell was indicted and charged with conspiracy to defraud
the United States.52 The district court relied upon Halper and dismissed the
charges.3 The court found that the $30,000 sanction bore no relation to a
remedial goal and therefore constituted punishment.54 As a result, the court held
that further prosecution would violate the double jeopardy clause. 5,
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district
court.5 6 Citing the HUD regulations providing for the sanction, the court found
that the sanction was remedial and not punitive. 7 Therefore, due to the remedial
nature of the sanction, further prosecution would not violate the double jeopardy
clause.58
The Bizzell decision makes it clear that it does not matter which comes first,
civil or criminal penalties. 59 If the civil sanction is not remedial, it constitutes
punishment and invokes the double jeopardy protections.' However, if statutory
authority suggests a remedial purpose for the sanction, double jeopardy protections
are unavailable. 6'
III. THE INSTANT DECISION
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals determined that while the district
court was correct in refusing to dismiss the criminal indictment against defendant,
the district court's analysis under the test expounded in Halper was incorrect.62
In the process of deciding to overrule the motion to dismiss the indictment, the
district court concentrated on the disparity between the civil and the criminal
penalties.63 The court of appeals stated that a correct application of the Halper
test required "a comparison between the civil penalty and the government's loss
resulting from defendant's conduct."' The appellate court noted that while the

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 266.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Reed, 937 F.2d at 577.
Id.

64. Id.
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facts of Halper made the instant case easily distinguishable, they found Halper
helpful in framing their analysis. 6"
The court held that the arbitrator's decision to impose a thirty-day
disciplinary suspension upon Reed was not disproportional to the harm caused to
the government by his conduct." Rather, the court stated that "we think the
sanction of suspension from employment for defendant's on-the-job conduct is best
characterized as an attempt by the arbitrator to vindicate the contract rights of the
government-and of the defendant-under the collective bargaining agreement
between them." 67 Furthermore, the court stated that any sanction the arbitrator
imposed "as long as it was within the framework provided by an employment
contract, serves legitimate nonpunitive governmental objectives and is by its nature
remedial. " 68
The court then looked to the purpose served by the arbitrator's decision to
suspend Reed.69 Judge Edmondson, writing for the majority, stated that even
though the suspension may seem like punishment to Reed, the goal of the
suspension was to vindicate the government's rights under the
collective
70
bargaining agreement and thereby "make the government whole."
In determining that the suspension handed down by the arbitrator was
remedial in nature and did not rise to the level of punishment under the fifth
amendment, the court held that the subsequent criminal indictment did not violate
the double jeopardy clause. 71 As such, the decision of the district court in
refusing to dismiss the indictment was affirmed.72
IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
The Reed court conducted a thorough analysis of the application of the
Halper test.73 If the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals had considered what
results an opposite decision would have rendered, the court could have saved itself
time. By reaching a different result, the court would have allowed every employee
covered by a collective bargaining agreement that contains a arbitration clause an
immunity from prosecution. The only requirement needed to invoke such
protection would be that the criminal activity take place in the workplace. 74 If
a collective bargaining agreement offered arbitration as a forum for grievance
resolution, all an employee would have to do to avoid criminal prosecution would

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 578.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.

74. See id.
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be to exercise his right to a hearing before an arbitrator. The hearing would then
invoke the double jeopardy protections of the fifth amendment.
The court did give cursory treatment to this possibility near the end of the
opinion. 5 Judge Edmondson stated "we will not offer up the double jeopardy
clause as a forum-shopping tool for government employees who have violated the
law."76 However, there is nothing in the opinion that indicates non-governmental
employees would be treated differently. It seems absurd to think that an employee
under a collective bargaining agreement containing an arbitration clause would be
given free reign to engage in any criminal activity in the workplace, answering
only to the arbitrator. But, if the court had reached any other decision, that would
be the result.
Judge Edmonson's opinion stated that any sanction imposed by the arbitrator
was not punishment if it met three requirements.77 Those requirements are: (1)
the sanction must be within the framework provided by the employment contract;
(2) it must serve legitimate nonpunitive governmental objectives; and (3) it must
by its nature be remedial.7' Given these requirements the court has effectively
eliminated the employee from ever claiming that the arbitrator's decision is
punishment. First, if the collective bargaining agreement calls for binding
arbitration, the sanction will be within the framework provided by the employment
contract. Judge Edmonson stated that the arbitrator's decision served to vindicate
the employer's rights under the bargaining agreement. 79 He went even further
by stating that "where an individual and the government enter into an employment
relationship governed by a collective bargaining agreement, arbitration awards
against the employee made pursuant to that agreement can only serve as remedies
for breach of the contract, and necessarily do no more than make the government
whole."80 It would seem that the Eleventh Circuit has established a set of
guidelines to determine whether an arbitrator's sanction is "punishment" that could
only have one result.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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CONCLUSION

The question of what constitutes punishment within the meaning of the
double jeopardy clause will surely arise again. However, the Eleventh Circuit has
answered the question concerning arbitrator's sanctions for the meantime. The
court undoubtedly -reached the proper resolution. Any other conclusion would
allow employees under collective bargaining agreements to use binding arbitration
as a forum-shopping device to avoid criminal punishment for the crimes they
commit in the workplace.
DAVID A. COLE
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